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PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE:
IN CAMERA AND BEYOND
WOODIE

A.

LILES* AND JOHN C. PATrERSoN, JR.**

Criminal discovery, a long-neglected stepchild of American jurisprudence,
has recently begun to receive prominent attention from commentators, courts,
and practitioners.' Responding to varying pressures and demands to eliminate
surprise from criminal proceedings, and in line with a growing movement to
rationalize the criminal processes, legislatures and courts have promulgated
rules of criminal discovery. 2 The primary concern of this article, however, is
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as a means for an
accused individual to discover prosecutorial evidence or information helpful
to his cause.
4
Beginning in 1935 with Mooney v. Holohan,3 the federal courts, aided by
5
some states' .decisions, have developed a body of law relating to discovery
6
under the due process clause. This culminated in Brady v. Maryland where
the Supreme Court held that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution." Although Brady remained relatively dormant for some years, both state and federal courts are now grappling with the
many problems inherent in the decision. This article will explore the history
of fourteenth amendment discovery and analyze its present and future role
in criminal law. Hopefully, the field of criminal discovery will become more
than "a morass of unreported trial court rulings, shrouded in intermittent
appellate fog."7
* BA. 1950; J.D. 1953, University of Florida; Judge, Second District Court of Appeal
(Florida).
*0 B.A. 1966, Duke University; J.D. 1969, University of Florida.
1. See, e.g., Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth,
1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279; Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 163
(1963); Garber, The Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1 COuM. L.Q. 3 (1962); Goldstein, The
State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149
(1960); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 228 (1964).
2. E.g., Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C §3500 (1964); FED R. CauM. P. 16; Ft.A. R. Cium. P. 1.220.
Criminal discovery did not exist at common law. Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B.
1792).
3. 294 U.S. 103 (1935). See text accompanying notes 30-31 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 28-57 infra.
5. E.g., Meats v. State, 422 P.2d 230 (Nev. 1967); People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853,
154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 31 (1966).
6. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
7. Margolin, Toward Effective Criminal Discovery in California- A Practitioner'sView,
[491]
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Although the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been
the touchstone for establishing the duty of prosecutorial disclosure and a
correlative right of defense discovery, some confusion has been generated by
two separate lines of cases dealing with the constitutional issues of fourteenth amendment discovery. The first concerns the law generated by Jencks
v. United States;8 the second, problems of discovery of minutes of grand jury
proceedings under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although
policy considerations may overlap, the legal foundations of these two areas
and due process disclosure are so dissimilar that attempts to intermingle them
would not be appropriate.
Jencks concerned the denial by a federal district court of defendant's
request to inspect FBI reports relating to trial testimony given by government witnesses. The United States Supreme Court reversed, refusing to
uphold the denial simply because a preliminary foundation of inconsistency
between the contents of the reports and the testimony of the witnesses was
not laid. The Court reasoned that requiring an accused first to show a conflict between such reports and trial testimony would actually deny him
evidence material and relevant to his defense. It held the evidence sought
need only appear relvant, competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule.'
Considerable congressional furor, based on a belief that such disclosure
would endanger national security in cases dealing with subversive organizations such as the Communist Party, followed this decision. The result was
the passage of the Jencks Act, 10 which significantly curtailed the operation of
Jencks in several respects. Discovery allowed under Jencks was postponed
until the government's witness had testified on direct examinations" and the
practice of submitting government documents to the trial judge for a determination of relevancy and materiality, disapproved by the Supreme Court,
was explicitly provided for in the act.' 2 Furthermore, if the Government
exercised its option to withhold the reports in the public interest, Congress
left the matter of dismissal to the discretion of the trial judge after striking
from the record the testimony of the appropriate witness,' 3 instead of requiring the criminal action to be dismissed.
When called upon to test the Jencks Act, the Court sidestepped making
the matter a constitutional issue under the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment. 4 Palermo v. United States" held Jencks to be an exercise of

56 CALIF. L. REV. 1040, 1059 (1968).

8.

353 U.S. 657 (1957).

9.

Id. at 667.

10.
11.

18 U.S.C. §3500 (1964).
Id. §3500(a).

12.

Id. §3500 (b).

13.

Id. §3500(d).

14. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. 360 U.S. 343, 345-46 (1959).
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the Court's power, in the absence of statutory provision, to prescribe procedures for the administration of justice in the federal courts. Carrying
6
Palermo to its logical conclusion, Scales v. United States' stated "[t]hat the
procedure set forth in the statute does not violate the Constitution and that
the procedure required by the decision of this Court in Jencks was not
,"17 As a
required by the Constitution was assumed by us in Palermo..
result, the legislation and litigation spawned by Jencks demonstrate only that
the Court and Congress have differing views as to how this aspect of federal
justice should be administered.
In the federal system, disclosure of grand jury minutes has been held to
be governed exclusively by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 (e),'1
which gives a trial judge authority to divulge matters other than deliberations
9
and the vote of a juror when a particularizedneed is shown.' In Dennis v.
20
United States the Court recognized the "'long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts' "21 and
stressed that when disclosure is permitted, it is to be done " 'discretely and
23
limitedly.' "22 However, these policies were tempered when the Court stated:
In our adversary system for determining guilt or innocence, it is
rarely justifiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a
storehouse of relevant fact. Exceptions to this are justifiable only by
the clearest and most compelling considerations.
It was also noted that when the functions of the 2grand jury are ended,
disclosure is proper if the ends of justice demand it. 4
While these cases involve no constitutional issue and are limited in
origin to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 (e), Justice Fortas, writing
for the Court in Dennis, did call for broadened criminal discovery by tying
the policy behind disclosure in this area to that impelling the Jencks Act.
"These developments are entirely consonant with the growing realization
that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily
promotes the proper administration of criminal justice."'2 5 Thus, the Jencks
case, the Jencks Act, and cases interpreting rule 6 (e) are useful in indicating
the Court's approach to the area of discovery under the due process clause.

16. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
17. Id. at 257-58.
18. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1959).
19. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
20. 384 U.S. 855 (1966). See also State v. Williams, 227 So. 2d 253, 256 (2d D.C.A. I-la.

1969).
21.
22.

Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869 (1966).
Id.

23. Id. at 873 (footnotes omitted).
24. Id. at 870. A provision similar to this is found in FLA. STAT. §905.27 (1967), which
was construed in State v. Drayton, 226 So. 2d 469, 474 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969), to permit in
camera inspection of grand jury testimony in certain circumstances.
25. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966).
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The distinction between rules and statutes governing discovery and the
more pervasive "discovery" rights under the fourteenth amendment requires
that the term "discovery" be applied to the former and "disclosure" to the
2
latter. As one commentator has stated: 6
On the one hand, discovery emphasizes the right of the defense to
obtain access to evidence necessary to prepare its own case; on the
other, disclosure stresses the duty of the prosecution to make available
to the accused the evidence and testimony without which an adequate
defense would be virtually impossible.
The difference between the two terms is only one of emphasis, as the correlative of a right of discovery is a duty to disclose, and the correlative of a duty
to disclose is a right to discover the matter to which the duty attaches. Moreover, even this difference of emphasis tends to be lost in some recent
decisions.27 Hopefully, however, the use of discovery and disclosure in the
above manner will serve to avoid confusing their distinctive backgrounds.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DISCLOSURE

An assessment of the current state of the law and an attempt to predict
its future trends must begin with an examination of the past, stressing the
areas of increased awareness that courts have noted in developing a new
principle of law from the wellspring of the fourteenth amendment. Only in
this manner can Brady v. Marylands be seen in its proper perspective. Brady
marks the maturation of a previously developing rule, and henceforth, legal
concern shifts from development to administration.
Justice Douglas remarked in Brady29 that the duty of prosecutorial disclosure under the fourteenth amendment is but an extension of Mooney v.
Holohan.3 0 In Mooney defendant alleged his fourteenth amendment rights
had been violated in that his conviction was based solely on perjured testimony knowingly used by the prosecuting authorities, and that these authorities deliberately suppressed evidence favorable to him. Although the petition
was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, the Court had no
31
difficulty in deciding the substantive issue:
[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied
by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction
through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means
of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of
26.

Note, Discovery and Disclosure: Dual Aspects of the Prosecutor's Role in Criminal

Procedure, 34 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 92, 93 (1965).
27. See, e.g., Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968),
1105 (1969).
28. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
29. Id. at 86.
30. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
31. Id. at 112-13.
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court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.
Such a contrivance . . . is as inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.
And the action of prosecuting officers on behalf of the State, like that
of administrative officers in the execution of its laws, may constitute
state action within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Any lingering uncertainty concerning the deliberate withholding of evidence
refuting the state's evidence was silenced in Pyle v. Kansas.32 In a petition
for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner alleged that his imprisonment resulted
from perjured testimony knowingly used by the prosecuting authorities and
from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to him. The allegations were held sufficient to charge a deprivation of
rights under the Federal Constitution. This ruling was followed in United
States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen,33 which held that the presentation of
false evidence by the prosecutor and corresponding suppression of evidence
favorable to the defendant violated the fourteenth amendment.
The tone for another advance in the development of this area of law
was set in the rather peculiar case of Griffin v. United States.3 4 The prosecutor
in that case was aware that a morgue attendant had found an open penknife
in the victim's pocket, but did not inform the defense. In remanding the
case at an earlier stage,3 5 the Supreme Court had stated that if the court of
appeals were to declare the controverted evidence admissible, it would have
to consider whether it would be too dogmatic for a court to conclude that
a jury would not have attached significance to the evidence had it been
introduced. The court of appeals held the evidence admissible and agreed
that the court could not predict the jury's evaluation of the evidence. The
court emphasized "the necessity of disclosure by the prosecution of evidence
that may reasonably be considered admissible and useful to the defense." 3
Griffin amounted to a departure from prior cases in that it was not at
all certain that the unrevealed evidence would exonerate the accused. 37 This
principle was reaffirmed by the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. A Imeida
v. Baldi.38 The prosecution produced evidence tending to prove that Almeida
fired the shot that killed a policeman in a felony-murder situation, while
suppressing evidence that another had committed the actual slaying. The
jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder without a recommendation of mercy. The court concluded that because the suppressed evidence
may have induced the jury to return a recommendation of mercy, due process
had been denied. In reaching the same conclusion, the Third Circuit stated
32. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
33. 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
34. 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

35. Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704 (1949).
36. 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
37. State cases following this trend include Fugate v. State, 169 Neb. 434, 99 N.W.2d
874 (1959); People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956); People v. Fisher, 23
Misc. 2d 391, 192 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1958).
38. 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
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in United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye,39 that the applicable principle
of law was that "[t]he suppression of evidence may be a denial of due process
when it is vital evidence, material to the issues of guilt or penalty."4 0 The
court concluded that since defendant's lack of sobriety was a central part of
the defense theory, prosecutorial knowledge of the arresting officer's statement that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of
arrest was vital to the defense.
Thompson is also significant in representing, along with the advisory
language of Griffin v. United States,41 a shift from concern with the reprehensible conduct of prosecuting authorities as a fraud on the courts (evidence
in the Mooney decision)42 to the harm occasioned by such conduct to the
defendant. Although the holding of Thompson was couched in terms of
suppression, there was no active attempt to conceal the officer's statement,
which indicated the inebriation of the defendant.4 3 People v. Savvides,44 a
frequently cited New York opinion, dealt with a situation in which a state
witness falsely testified that there was no agreement he would receive lenient
treatment in return for his testimony. The state permitted this to pass unchallenged and uncorrected. Holding this conduct to have violated the accused's
due process rights, the court stated: "That the district attorney's silence was
not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for its impact
was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be
46
termed fair."45 Prejudice to the defendant was also noted in Alcorta v. Texas,
5
47
although the Supreme Court cited Mooney v. Holohan and Pyle v. Kansa~s-'
in stating the guiding principles for the decision.
This was firmly established in the Court's decision two years later in
Napue v. Illinois.4 9 The principal state witness had testified that he had
received no promise of consideration in return for his testimony. The state
attorney knew this to be false but did nothing to correct it. Upon certiorari,
the Court reversed a lower court judgment denying defendant's petition to
set aside the conviction, stating that a conviction obtained through the use
of false evidence, known to be false by representatives of the state, must fall
under the fourteenth amendment. The same result is obtained when the
state, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected.5"

39. 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
40. Id. at 765.
41. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
42. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935).
43. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 768 (3d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
44. 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956).
45. Id. at 855, N.Y.S.2d at 887.
46. 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
47. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
48. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
49. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
50. "The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false
testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not
cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes to the credibility of the witness. The

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss4/1
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A new concept was inserted into this line of cases when "negligent suppression," or passive nondisclosure, was introduced. In United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp.,51 defendant appealed a conviction for an
alleged Sherman Act violation, arguing that he was denied due process by
way of the Government's failure to divulge the contents of a certain government file. No contention was made that the government's suppression was
willful. Rather than deciding whether this negligent suppression violated
due process, the court called for a new trial on the basis that denial of a new
trial would be inconsistent with the correct administration of criminal justice
in the federal courts. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals encountered the
issue directly in Kyle v. United States.5 2 In Kyle, defendant based his claim
on the government's alleged suppression or loss of certain correspondence that
had been in its possession before trial but that could not be located until a
time subsequent to the trial. On appeal from a denial of the motion without
an evidentiary hearing, the court reversed and remanded the case for a
hearing on whether the negligent suppression constituted harmless or
reversible error.
Application of Kapatos 53 summarizes the pre-Brady line of cases, as well

as adding a prophetic policy justification for the expansion of the prosecution's duty to disclose "exculpatory" evidence. Petitioning the court for a
writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the prosecution's
failure to disclose the existence of witnesses who saw two persons, neither
of whom was the petitioner, running from the scene of the crime constituted a
denial of due process. The court acknowledged that "knowing use of perjured
testimony, failure to correct false testimony, and failure to disclose evidence
that would have completely exonerated the accused, are clear examples of
conduct constituting a denial of due process," 54 although not exhausting the
situations to which the guarantee of due process extends. The criteria
rendering conduct in this area violative of due process were as yet undefined. 55
While cases often arise from a failure to correct false evidence, the court noted
the developing emphasis on the state's failure to disclose evidence "that might
have had substantial significance for the defense."5 6 The policy expounded
5 7
for this development was:

jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of a
witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend." Id. at 269. See
also Smallwood v. Warden, 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962), holding the motive of the
state's attorney to be immaterial as to suppressing or withholding evidence if it is likely
to have affected the result of the trial.
51. 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
52. 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964).
53. 208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), approved in Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288,
298 (5th Cir. 1968).
54. Id. at 887.
55.

Id.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 888. See also Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 931 (1963), holding that a district attorney's failure to disclose to the defense the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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The purpose of a trial is as much the acquittal of an innocent person
as it is the conviction of a guilty one. The average accused usually does
not have the manpower or resources available to the state in its investigation of the crime. Nor does he have access to all the evidence, much
of which has usually been removed or obliterated by the time that he
learns that he is to be tried for the crime. In view of this disparity
between the investigating powers of the state and the defendant, I do
not think it imposes too onerous a burden on the state to require it
to disclose the existence of a [significant] witness. .

.

. At the very

least, the trial judge should have been made aware of this evidence,
and a ruling should have been requested by the prosecutor with respect
to his duty in the premises.
Brady

AND

BEYOND

The Supreme Court gave its sanction to these developments in 1963 in
Brady v. Maryland.58 Counsel for one of two codefendants in a murder case
had asked prior to trial to examine the extra-judicial statements of the other
defendant, but a confession to the actual killing was withheld by the prosecuting authorities. Brady's counsel admitted his client's guilt and asked only
that he be spared capital punishment. Both codefendants were found guilty
and sentenced to death. The Maryland Court of Appeals held this failure
to disclose denied Brady due process and remanded the case for retrial on
the question of punishment only. On certiorari, the Court affirmed in an
opinion by Justice Douglas. After discussing approvingly prior judicial
development of the subject, the Court stated: 59
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates clue process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
Further:6 0
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for
misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the
accused .... A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an

accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or
reduce the penalty helps to shape a trial that bears heavily on the
defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice, even
though, as in the present case, his action is not "the result of guile ......

existence, known to him, of opinions of a psychiatrist and psychologist engaged by the
state that the defendant was legally incompetent, amounted to a denial of due process. This
case was described in 77 HARV. L. REv. 1528, 1529 (1964), as "[t]he first court of appeals
decision based squarely on an affirmative duty to disclose information supporting possible
lines of defense."
58. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
59. Id. at 87.
60. Id. at 87-88 (footnotes omitted).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss4/1
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Brady focuses the deprivation of due process squarely upon the defendant,
since the quality of the conduct of the prosecution is no longer a consideration, and thus implicitly approves of the cases holding "negligent suppression" or passive disclosure to be a violation of due process. Rather than a
radical innovation, this portion of the Court's holding is more in the way
of a culmination of prior judicial developments. 61 Underlying a deprivation
of due process is an unfair trial to an accused, with the implicit premise that
a defendant deprived of sufficient evidence to present an adequate defense
62
is deprived of his right to due process.
Brady marked a subtle shift from the prior cases. Previously, courts had
tended to develop this area of law, not by flatly stated principles, but through
case-by-case determinations, reflecting the feelings expressed in Judge Hastie's
concurring opiniori in United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye:63 "[T]his is an
area in which the question of fundamental fairness depends so much upon the
facts of the particular case that a precise rule cannot be devised." But Brady
furnished courts and attorneys with a rule, albeit imprecise, and henceforth
this rule, in addition to a court's notions of fundamental fairness, would
be the starting point in determining the prosecution's duties of disclosure.
Perhaps inevitably, the Brady decision left unanswered many questions
concerning its scope and administration. Should it be read as giving a criminal
defendant a pretrial right to the disclosure of favorable evidence? Would
all abridgements of a defendant's rights under Brady constitute reversible
error, or would some be considered harmless? Does the admissibility of the
evidence limit the duty to disclose, or does Brady apply to all relevant evidence? And who is to make the determination of "materiality" and "favorableness" - the prosecution authorities, the trial judge, or the defense? Need
the defendant establish some predicate for his "request"? The Supreme Court
left these and other issues unanswered in Giles v. Maryland, 4 where a "plurality" of three justices- found it unnecessary and inappropriate to examine
whether the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose extends to all evidence
61. See text accompanying notes 28-57 supra.
62.

Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty To Reveal Evidence to the Defense, 74

YALE LJ.136,

142-43 (1964).
63. 221 F.2d 763, 769 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).

64. 886 U.S. 66 (1967).
65. Justice Brennan authored the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Douglas. Justice White concurred in the judgment. However, he differed from
the plurality in finding no violation of the rule established in Napue v. Illinois, 860 U.S.
264 (1959), that a conviction must fall under the fourteenth amendment when the prosecution, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears,
even though the testimony may be relevant only to the credibility of a witness. Justice Fortas
concurred on the basis that the issue posed should be resolved in favor of the defendant.
Justices Harlan, Black, Clark, and Stewart dissented. In their opinion, the holding of
Brady was dictum, and such issues should be left for legislative determination. 386 U.S.
at 116-19 (1967). Interestingly, Justice White thought the entire due process discussion
of Brady to be "wholly advisory," Brady v. Maryland, 878 U.S. 83, at 92 (1963) indicating
that he would not cast a broad rule of criminal discovery in constitutional form. Thus,
five of the nine members of the Court that decided Brady have considered its due process
holding to be dicta.
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admissible and useful to the defense. Only Justice Fortas was willing to
decide the principal issue. 66 Thus, the task of exploring the dimensions of
Brady has remained for the lower federal and state courts. In light of their
predictably varied responses, future discussion will be framed in terms of
the extent of prosecutorial evidence affected; when rights and duties take
effect; and procedures for effecting Brady.
PROSECUTORIAL EVIDENCE:

THE OPEN FILE AND OTHER PROBLEMS

Under the Brady doctrine, evidence within its purview, such as a statement of an accused to the police,C7 cannot be withheld by any state official.
To the contrary, the state has the affirmative duty to disclose favorable evidence even though the prosecuting authorities may be completely unmindful
of the suppression.68 On the other hand, the state's duty to disclose evidence
favorable to the defense is not unlimited. One restriction was stated in Link
v. United States, 9 where the court held that withholding evidence useful only
for impeaching a witness or attacking his credibility was not a violation of
due process under Brady. An exception occurs when this evidence is of such
inherent significance that its suppression would represent fundamental unfairness.7 0 In addition, work product material has been held to be beyond Brady's
scope,7 1 although such a statement is unnecessarily broad. Since work product
is not a constitutional doctrine, any conflict between Brady and a work
product rule should be resolved in favor of the former.-'
However, limitations on disclosure are often couched in more general
terms. The defendant in United States v. Jordan73 asserted entitlement to
obtain from the Government (under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
16 (b) and Brady v. Maryland) all materials that might be useful in the
preparation of a defense, including the names and addresses of witnesses whose
statements appeared to aid neither the prosecution nor the defense and witnesses who gave no statements at all. The court denied defendant's demand:7 4

66.

Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967).

67. Butler v. Maroney, 819 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1968).
68. Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964).
69. 852 F.2d 207, 212 (8th Cir. 1965).
70. See Williams v .Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1105 (1969). But see Loraine v. United States, 396 1.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 933 (1968), holding that evidence within the Brady rule may be material within its
meaning even though the evidence goes only to credibility of a witness. See also Coleman
v. Maxwell, 273 F. Supp. 275, 280 (S.D. Ohio 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1058 (1969),
holding that evidence of impeachment value is not included under Brady where it is not
material to the guilt of the accused.
71. United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419 (S.D. Ind. 1967). It is unclear what
the court meant by "work product," since it suggested that Brady may require inspection
of "government-investigated reports germane and pertinent to the case." Id. at 420.
72. For an exhaustive treatment of this problem see State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
73. 399 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1005 (1968).
74. Id. at 615. See also North American Rockwell Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 389 F.2d 866, 873
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Brady v. Maryland does not require the government to disclose the
myriad immaterial statements and names and addresses which an
extended investigation'is bound to produce.
A motion for the production of all favorable or exculpatory evidence in
United States v. Gleason75 was considered tantamount to asking for an
unqualified order that the Government take everything from its files the
defendant may find useful. The court reasoned that Brady concerned "suppression of evidence,"76 a term that denotes exclusive possession and control.
Thus, if the defendant could personally obtain favorable or exculpatory
material, Brady would not require its disclosure by the prosecution if the
defendant failed to make the required exertion. 77 This rationale has also been
used in a holding that disclosure of evidence in the possession of the prosecution should not be compelled when it is reasonably available under applicable
7
rules of criminal procedure. 1
A different rationale, reaching an opposite conclusion, was employed in
Levin v. Katzenbach.79 Appellant alleged that the Government failed to disclose two pieces of evidence, including a statement of a government witness
that, in the context of the case, might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt. The Government contended that
because the statement could have been discovered by the appellant, the government's failure to disclose it did not violate appellant's rights. A majority
of the court of appeals did not agree, holding that: 0
[A]ppellant's claim for relief based upon a breach of the prosecutor's
duty of disclosure challenges the fairness, and therefore the validity, of
the proceedings, and relief, either on a motion for a new trial or for
habeas corpus, may not depend on whether more able, diligent or
(10th Cir. 1968): "Brady did not declare that a prosecutor must on demand comb his files
for bits and pieces of evidence which conceivably could be favorable for the defense."
75. 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
76. The court's analysis may be criticized in that, although "suppression" has continued in use as a signal word in due process disclosure, cases even before Brady considerably diminished the importance of adhering to the strict meaning of the term. See,
e.g., Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963); United
States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
77. But see Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931
(1963), holding that failure of a district attorney to disclose the existence of opinions of a
psychiatrist and psychologist that defendant was legally incompetent injected such fundamental unfairness into the trial as to constitute a denial of due process. Judge DeVane,
dissenting, pointed out that defense counsel must have known of the examinations of his
client; and in fact he engaged his own psychiatrist and still did not assert mental incapacity. Id. at 85. Thus, Judge DeVane would refuse to substitute his judgment for that
of the defense attorney. See also Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(dissenting opinion).
78. State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 555 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); State v. Williams, 227
So. 2d 253, 257 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). See also Corbett v. Patterson, 272 F. Supp. 602, 609
(D. Colo. 1967).
79. 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966), noted in 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 764 (1967).
80. Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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fortunate counsel might possibly have come upon the evidence on his
own. A criminal trial is not a game of wits between opposing counsel,
cleverer party, or the one with the greater resources, to be the "winner."
The dissenting opinions, by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger criticized the
rule announced by the majority as "a thinly disguised holding that defense
counsel gave Appellant ineffective assistance," ' 82 which placed the advantage
in a criminal trial with the accused. By encouraging slovenly preparation
for trial, the majority opinion causes in fact what it denounces in theory 83
criminal trials as games of wits.

Although the holding in Levin has been cited favorably in subsequent
cases, 814 it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would hold the controversial
portion of the majority opinion in Levin to reach constitutional dimensions.
The Court has yet to give any indication of how far Brady should reach in
this direction. Since four of the eight members of the presently constituted
Court, aside from Chief Justice Burger, have indicated their preference for
legislation in this area and regard Brady as dicta or wholly advisory," ', Levn
will probably remain restricted to the District of Columbia Circuit and those
jurisdictions that choose to adopt it.
THE DUTY

To

DIsCLOSE-

TIME OF COMMENCEMENT

Consideration of the timing of the state's duty to disclose evidence
favorable to the defense, and the defendant's correlative right to obtain such
evidence, must begin with the proposition that the underlying principle of
due process disclosure is fairness. 86 More explicitly: s7
The presumed - and ordinarily well founded - superiority of the
prosecution's facilities for fact-gathering constitutes the basis for this
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence and for the enforcement of it
by setting aside convictions secured in part because of its violation.
Thus, for fairness to be achieved in a criminal trial, the state must disclose
evidence gleaned by its superior investigatory resources in a manner such
that the defense can use it with maximum effectiveness.ss While such evidence

81.

Id. at 292 (Burger, J., dissenting).

82. Id. at 295.
83. Id.
84. United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1967); Imbler v. Craven, 298 F.
Supp. 795, 809 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
85. See note 65 supra.
86. See State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 553 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
87. Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion). The
majority opinion would agree on this point. Id. at 290. See also Application of Kapatos,
208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Note, supra note 62, at 143.
88. State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 553 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); State v. Drayton, 226
So. 2d 469, 471 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
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often can be effectively used prior to trial with a maximum of legal economy, 9
it may also be used just as effectively during the course of the trial if continuances are granted the defense for full preparation.9 0 Fairness, the touchstone for due process disclosure, is not necessarily affected by the moment in
which disclosure is obtained. This is the rationale behind the refusal of
courts to hold that the Brady rule, and its concomitant rights and duties,
applies at any particular time.91
Aside from the constitutional rationale, allowing a trial judge discretion
as to the time of prosecutorial disclosure has positive administrative results.
One of the most frequently discussed and widely acknowledged difficulties in
the expanding law of criminal discovery or disclosure is that certain elements
would use such procedures to suborn perjury, intimidate or eliminate witnesses, and the like.9 2 Thus, provision for protective orders is usually made
in rules of criminal discovery. 93 The Brady principle applies only to evidence
favorable to or exculpatory of the defendant and thus it is unlikely that he
would desire to affect a change in such evidence through unscrupulous or
illegal means. However, conceivably Brady evidence could lead to knowledge
of prosecutorial evidence that such a defendant would like to so change.
Opportunity for such reprehensible practices to occur can be minimized by
postponing the prosecution's duty to disclose until after its presentation of
the particular piece of evidence to which the duty applies, or if possible
until after the presentation of its case.
However, it is questionable whether a trial judge could deny completely
a defendant's constitutional right to favorable prosecutorial evidence, even
if good cause could be shown that the defense would use such disclosure to
subvert the processes of justice. Unlike rules of criminal procedure, which
offer statutory rights that the legislature may restrict at will, constitutional
rights may not be so easily limited. The standard of appellate review to be
applied in considering judicial denials of appropriate motions94 or prosecutorial failure to disclose under Brady is pertinent. 95 If a harmless error
doctrine may be applied, it follows that the central concern is still with the
over-all fairness of the trial. Thus, a refusal by the prosecution to disclose
or refusal of a trial judge to order disclosure of Brady evidence would not
be unconstitutional if it were not prejudicial to the presentation of defendant's
case. Under another view, using a quid pro quo concept of fairness, denial
of disclosure would not be necessarily unconstitutional if an approach similar

89. See A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 73-75 (May 1969 Tent. Draft).
90. State v. Drayton, 226 So. 2d 469, 473 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
91. State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 553 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). Cf. Cicenia v. Legay, 357
U.S. 504 (1958). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 8, 31 (1966).
92. See, e.g., Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal
Law, 14 VAND. L. REv. 921, 935-36 (1961).
93. See, e.g., Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500 (1964); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(e).
94. See text accompanying notes 128-152 infra.
95. Id.
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to that of the Jencks Act were used. 96 For example, under this concept, a
refusal of the state to reveal a statement favorable to the defense made by one
of the state's witnesses would not require dismissal or reversal if the trial
court prevented the prosecution from using the witness. But if a more
stringent standard of appellate review is to be applied, and all denials of
disclosure under Brady are to be considered constitutionally impermissible,
then prosecutorial and judicial discretion is limited to the time of disclosure.
ADMINISTERING

Brady:

THE PROBLEM OF THE PREDICATE

Since Brady did not establish a constitutionally protected right to compel
prosecutorial disclosure at any specific time, and since a request or motion is
not a sine qua non to create a duty on the prosecution's part, 97 then the duty

to disclose, absent a request, rests solely with the prosecuting authorities
until its exercise may be tested on appeal. 98 However, what problems would
arise if a defendant were to request prosecutorial disclosure prior to trial,
setting forth circumstances that would persuade a trial judge that the prosecution was in the exclusive possession of favorable evidence? Should an order
compelling disclosure be immediately issued, or should it be postponed until
trial?
The task of resolving these and other problems presented by the Brady
rule is as much administrative as legal. All that Brady requires is that the
disclosure occur so that the accused can effectively utilize the evidence. The
situation may be complicated by state law,99 although the thrust of judicial
statements that there is no criminal discovery at common law usually means
that there is no right to such discovery.100 The decision whether to sanction
formal pretrial discovery through appropriate court orders is ultimately for
the trial judge.

96. 18 U.S.C. §3500 (1964).
97. United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1964). But see
United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968), where the court recanted to a degree.
The defendant in Keogh alleged that nondisclosure of certain investigative reports of the
Government violated his rights under Brady. The court replied that the principle announced there would not help the defendant. "We cannot agree with petitioner that where
there has not been deliberate suppression . . . the absence of a request is irrelevant. It serves
the valuable office of flagging the importance of the evidence for the defense and thus
imposes on the prosecutor a duty to make a careful check on his files. This consideration
is of peculiar weight in a case . . . of a very long trial with many witnesses and much documentary evidence." Id. at 147.
98. For a full examination of a prosecutor's initial duties under Brady, see State v.
Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 556-57 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
99. State laws prohibiting pretrial inspection or disclosure would not conflict with the
Constitution except in the improbable situation where favorable or exculpatory prosecutorial evidence could only be effectively used if revealed prior to trial. ,See State v. Drayton,
226 So. 2d 469, 475 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1276, 1283 & n.28 (1966); cf. Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34 F.R.D. 87, 90 (1964).
100. E.g., State v. Drayton, 226 So. 2d 469, 473-74 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
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PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS IN SPAIN

lized. Therefore, nonexclusive licensing with the running royalty agreement
should be chosen if capital gains are not possible. In this way more protection
can be retained by the licensor parent company, and the tax can be spread
over the life of the patent or of the royalty agreement.7 3 There is no deferral
in any of these direct alternatives.
The indirect licensing or outright sales approach can be utilized only
when a United States company has assets outside of the country in another
related corporation that can be transferred to the Spanish entity. In fact, many
American corporations now have research departments in England and
Germany, which provide a substantial source of technology for related European companies and even the United States parent.74 This scheme can be
used only by those companies that already have at least some form of existing
foreign operations.
Acquisitions of Spanish Going Concerns and Joint-Venture Operations
A favorite alternative of many foreign investors is to acquire an existing
Spanish company rather than form a new one. The advantages are primarily
related to the "going concern" factor, which is especially important in
operations outside the home territory. This form of operation smooths the
transition into the very different Spanish business environment, especially if
Spanish management can be retained.
However, this alternative contains many problems. Spanish financial
records are difficult to obtain and do not disclose the true operations situation. Because of the widespread use of multiple sets of business records and
weak internal control practices, the past history of a business is frequently
unreliable or undeterminable. Thus, value is uncertain, "hidden liabilities"
such as taxes and creditors are difficult to guard against, and problems such
as an uneconomical labor force are present in varying degrees in most companies that can be acquired.75 Acquiring assets to avoid these hidden problems
is not a workable alternative because the tax cost is prohibitive.76 In most
cases, therefore, stock is acquired by foreign investors.

73. See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
74. See What U.S. Companies Are Doing Abroad-Tapping Talent Overseas, U.S.
NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Feb. 26, 1968, at 60. If the foreign corporation develops patents to

be used in the United States, then United States source of income problems arise. See
§§861-964. For a very good, current discussion of this matter see Limitations Upon the Use
of Shadow Foreign Subsidiaries Tax Act of 1966, 21 TAx L. REv. 383 (1968). See also note
58 supra for a discussion of the deferral possibilities of this avenue.
75. Employees cannot be laid off in Spain except for due cause, and even then not
"en masse."
76. In Spain there is a 4% transfer tax on the amount of the liabilities transferred.
Spanish companies have traditionally carried a very high debt structure. Thus, the cost
of transferring the liabilities would be out of the question, and canceling these would be
almost always an impractical eventuality. The assets themselves, when transferred, are
subject to a transfer tax, capital gains tax, and many other forms of stamp duties, et cetera.
The transfer of stock (that is, the purchase by the foreign company of the stock in the
Spanish enterprise) is only subject to an approximate tax rate of 2.7% (including transfer
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Another consideration is whether to acquire more than a fifty per cent
interest in the company. This depends upon the company's policies and objectives, the agreements to be reached, and the possibility of obtaining an
authorization from the Spanish Ministry of Government. All of these are of
crucial importance to the foreign investor.
Among the practical problems that can arise in conducting a joint venture
with Spanish interests is the conflict between local management views and
over-all foreign company policies. There should be an understanding from the
beginning as to matters such as tax policy. This becomes important in a
country such as Spain where tax evasion is very commonplace. The foreign
investor cannot convert funds into a foreign currency unless he can prove
the payment of Spanish taxes. 77 The use of the Spanish "global method" of
taxation as a solution to this problem is often utilized if agreeable to both
parties. This system determines the taxpayers' tax base by using an objective
approach of allocating the tax burden by industries on factors other than
their income. Under this method, "normalization" of the tax situation is
made simpler, and the "two-set of books" system can be more readily rationalized by the management of the foreign company.
Loan agreements are also a matter of importance. Spanish credit is very
tight and a company with established credit lines becomes a valuable asset.
This matter is made even more crucial because present Spanish foreign investment laws provide that a company in which foreign investors own more
than twenty-five per cent cannot have a debt structure that exceeds fifty per
cent of its equity. This is a very serious limitation in any country, as to almost
any type of company. Since this restriction applies only to long-term debts
(over eighteen months), revolving loans or long-term loans that are continually extended or renewed can be utilized as a means of avoiding the full impact of these restrictive measures. Foreign banks are prohibited from carrying
on banking business in Spain and their influence is greatly limited because
foreign companies are not allowed to own more than twenty-five per cent of
a Spanish bank. A foreign company with access to established lines of credit
through the acquisition of a Spanish company is, therefore, in a very envious
position vis-a-vis other foreign companies.
The relationships of the parent foreign company to the Spanish entity
should be carefully considered in a Spanish joint venture involving questions
of intercompany transactions such as pricing, loans and exports. Additional
matters such as marketing policy should be discussed and resolved through
the articles of incorporation, bylaws, management contracts and similar agreements. If these difficulties can be solved and a favorable working relationship
established, the advantages of Spanish participation in the management can
be a very valuable asset.

taxes and notary fees), and capital gains will usually not be incurred by the seller unless
he held the property for less than a year.

77. Foreign exchange rules are rigidly applied in Spain.
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patory materials of any kind, "at least the first pretrial revelation to be
required of the Government should be taken in camera."115
Decisions questioning whether in camera disclosure should be ordered
prior to trial due to the practical difficulties involved in such inspection"r6
were acknowledged by the court. However, its conclusion that the in camera
device should be used exclusively in making determinations under Brady
is questionable on another basis. The court left unchallenged the sufficiency
of a motion for disclosure of all favorable evidence without any specificity
to set in motion judicial machinery to implement such a request. If the court
had denied the motion on the ground that a sufficient predicate had not been
established,3r 7 it could have avoided the excessive judicial labor involved in
in camera examination of any evidence that could possibly be considered
favorable to the defense under Brady, while reserving the in camera proceeding for situations where the duty to disclose is questionable.
Opinions suggesting a blanket rule postponing disclosure until trial are
questionable on the same basis. For example, United States v. Cobb" s and
United States v. Curry," 9 while acknowledging that the prosecution is under
Brady to disclose favorable evidence, felt that in light of practical difficulties
attending in camera examination before trial the decision as to whether the
Government possesses such evidence must be left to the good conscience of
the prosecuting authorities. This delegation would be subject to the sanction
that if disclosure is delayed until trial and the limited time prevents the
defense from using it effectively, the Government risks a mistrial. If courts
(in contrast to Cobb and Curry) stress the need of a proper predicate for
compelling disclosure under Brady, they can avoid excessive application of
the sanction of a mistrial by: (1) requiring disclosure directly to the defense
when the prosecution makes the disclosure prior to trial on its own initiative,
as well as when the defense establishes through a predicate a clear entitlement
for disclosure; (2) refusing to compel disclosure where no predicate or an
insufficient predicate is given; or (3) reserving the judicial labor inherent in
an in camera examination prior to trial for situations where it is questionable
2
whether the evidence sought falls within the ambit of Brady." 0
On the other hand, one commentator has urged that the prosecution
115. Id. at 885.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
117. Cf. State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1969); State v. Williams,
227 So. 2d 253 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
118. 271 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
119. 278 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
120. The advantages of an in camera inspection for determining whether particular
evidence of debatable value to the defense must be disclosed under Brady are set forth in
Comment, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 764, 770 (1967): "This procedure would minimize the danger of
subsequent reversal since a judicial evaluation of the usefulness of evidence to the defense
is a factual determination, and the court's findings would not be disturbed unless 'dearly
erroneous.'" But cf. Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209, 1217-18 (1967) (dissenting opinion).

A.B.A.

PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JuSrrIC,

STANDARDS

RELATING TO

(May 1969 Tent. Draft) envisaged the following
as the procedure most appropriate for effectuating Brady: "What tends to negate guilt will
DISCOVERY AND PROCmDURE BEFORE TRIAL
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should be required before trial to give all relevant evidence to the defense.1
The rationale for this proposal is that the defense can best test the usefulness
of any particular piece of evidence. 12 2 Full disclosure would only be tempered
by some unannounced procedure for protecting the legitimate interests of the
prosecutor and of society, such as informer's privilege, work product, protecting witnesses, state secrets and executive privilege. 23 But this proposal is
questionable on two levels. First, if adversariness is still to be retained as
the model for fairness in our criminal system, full prosecutorial disclosure
would appear to weight the balance of advantage in favor of the accused.124

necessarily be decided in the first instance by the prosecuting attorney simply because it is
he who has the material and information. It may be expected that he will make this
decision in light of his sense of justice, and also with the assurance that any decision not
to disclose will be subject to judicial review. And whatever the constitutional impetus provided by Brady and its eventual successors, judges will continue to be anxious, and perhaps
even generous, in ensuring that accused persons are protected from shortsightedness as well
as overreaching on the part of governmental agents. Accordingly, it may be expected that
generally, prosecuting authorities will become accustomed to disclosing all material which
is even possibly exculpatory, as a prophylactic against reversible error and in order to save
court time arguing about it. It may be noted that one state court has declared that in cases
of doubt, the prosecutor should at least disclose the material to the trial judge.
"'As we see it, the prosecution should disclose to the defense such information as it has
that may reasonably be considered admissible and useful to the defense in the sense that
it is probably material and exculpatory, and where there is doubt as to what is admissible
and useful for that purpose, the trial court should decide whether or not a duty to disclose
exists.' State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101, 109 (1965) (emphasis added), also quoted in
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 80 (1967) (Brennan's 'plurality' opinion)." Id. at 74-75. See
also State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550, 555 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
121. Note, The Posecutor's Constitutional Duty To Reveal Evidence to tle Defendant,
74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964). Prosecutorial disclosure is sometimes accomplished voluntarily. See
Symposium, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 113 (1963) for empirical
data regarding discovery practice in the District of Columbia. Factors operative in giving or
refusing informal discovery are set forth in text accompanying note 115 supra.
122. "Allowing the prosecutor to judge whether or not evidence is helpful without
giving it to the defense counsel would be tampering with the adversary process dramatically.
The prosecutor's job is to present the state's case, not to determine what theories his opponent can use." Note, supra note 121, at 148.
123. Id. at 149. However, the in camera device may be appropriate here. See Comment,
42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 764, 767 (1967).
124. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960), for an exhaustive analysis of the factors weighing both
sides of the scale. His conclusion as of 1960 was that the balance of advantage lay with
the prosecution. But see Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger,
J., dissenting): "Although the Government is bound to disclose all exculpatory evidence
within its control, defense counsel is under no obligation to reveal evidence which would
aid the prosecution. Often, of course, the most crucial facts relating to criminal charges lie
in the defendant's control and are constitutionally protected from access by the prosecution.
The presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination and the Governnient's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are further protections for the defendant .... " See Symposium, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 109-12 (1963).
As to possible extensions of prosecutional discovery see Louisell, Criminal Discovery and SelfIncrimination: Roger Traynor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CALIF L. REv. 89 (1965); Wilder,
Prosecution Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 3
(1967).
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This would diminish the capacity of the system to perform equitably, since
two generally equal adversaries are necessary for such performance. Moreover,
even if the criminal process is thought to be something more than a strictly
adversary system, since the duty of the state is both to convict and to see that
justice is done, 25 it is at least questionable that the courts rather than
legislatures should be the initiators of such extensive departures from law
and practice.126 jencks'12 7 should serve as a reminder that judicial pronouncements in the area of procedure are not always sacrosanct in the legislative
arena.
STANDARDS

FOR APPEALs-Is CONSTITuTIoNAL ERROR PERMISSIBLE?

Assuming that an appellate court finds a defendant has been denied a
constitutionally protected right to obtain prosecutional disclosure, there still
remains the dilemma of whether the violation of the defendant's right requires
a new trial. Several factors present themselves for the court's attention. The
conduct of the prosecuting authorities may be so reprehensible, such as the
knowing introduction of perjured testimony unfavorable to the defendant,
that the court may feel no need to consider the matter further. On the other
hand, the prosecution may have negligently omitted to inform the defense of
clearly exculpatory evidence to which he would have been entitled under
Brady. Again, the court may tend to stop with an examination of this factor
alone. However, an increasing number of cases present a blending of several
factors, and appellate courts, in attempting to achieve a just result, must
therefore sift through these factors in light of often conflicting precedent.
Early cases in the area of prosecutorial disclosure dealt with intentional
suppression, such as deliberate concealment of favorable evidence2s and
knowing use of perjured testimony 129 or false evidence 2 0 to obtain a conviction. Since these cases emphasized conduct constituting fraud on the courts
and the processes of justice,'3 ' there was little need for the courts to go any
further for finding cause for a new trial. However, if the courts had desired,
the granting of new trials in such cases could have been justified on the
125. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
126. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 119 (1967) (dissenting opinion); cf. 77 HARv.
L. Rsv. 1528, 1530 (1964).
127. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), discussed in text accompanying notes
9-17 supra;see 77 HARv. L. Ray. 1528, 1530 (1964).
128. See, e.g., Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
129. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
130. Cf. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), involving false testimony being produced
by a state witness and the state, knowing it to be false, allowing it to go uncorrected. As to
the argument that the state court had held the false evidence could not in any likelihood
have affected the judgment of the jury, the Court replied that it was not bound, where
there was a claim of a denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, by conclusions of
lower courts. Rather, it will reexamine the evidentiary basis on which these conclusions
are founded. Upon review, the Court found that the use of false evidence by the state
"may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial." Id. at 272.
131. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
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basis that prejudice to a defendant can be assumed in such cases, and that
granting a new trial serves as a sanction to deter further prosecutorial misconduct.
As the cases began to deal less with active suppression of evidence favorable to an accused and began to move into the area of "negligent nondisclosure," 1 32 fraud on the processes of justice became less applicable and the harm
to the defendant occasioned by the failure to disclose became the court's
chief concern. 13 3 In such situations, a harmless error doctrine seems readily
applicable, since a new trial will hardly deter prosecutorial oversight,1 34 and
evidence of slight or speculative value left undisclosed would hardly seem
sufficiently prejudicial to the defense to warrant a new trial. However, this
reasoning has not always found favor in the courts.
The first case to reject it, albeit impliedly, was People v. Savvides,35 often
cited for its holding that negligent suppression is violative of due process.
After holding that the petitioner had been denied his rights under this
theory, the court rejected the respondent's contention that a new trial should
not be granted since guilt was clearly established and disclosure would not
have changed the verdict. -3 Kyle v. United States137 attempted to place the
1 38
problem in perspective:
The conclusion we draw from all this is that the standard of how
serious the probable effect of an act or omission at a criminal trial
must be in order to obtain the reversal or, where other requirements
are met, the vacating of a sentence, is in some degree a function of
the gravity of the act or omission; the strictness of the application
of the harmless error standard seems somewhat to vary, and its reciprocal, the required showing of prejudice, to vary inversely, with the
degree to which the conduct of the trial has violated basic concepts of
fair play.
132. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287
(D.C. Cir. 1966); People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956).
133. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
134. See Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950), at text accompanying
notes 34-36 supra for a situation where even the most diligent prosecutor could not have
foreseen a duty to disclose the evidence involved.
135. 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956).
136. Id. at 854, N.Y.S.2d at 887.
137. 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961).
138. Id. at 514. The court also cited with approval Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor
To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLUM. L. Rrv. 858, 863 (1960), contrasting: "[V]hat
is thus believed to be the rule that the knowing use of perjured testimony requires reversal
even though prejudice is not affirmatively shown, with 'the area of passive nondisclosure of
exculpatory evidence, in which prejudice is the central matter of inquiry and the evidence
not disclosed is subjected to a critical examination to determine whether it is reasonably
likely that a different result would have been reached had the exculpatory evidence been
made available.'" Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 513 (2d Cir. 1961).
Kyle was cited approvingly in Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
See Smallwood v. Warden, 205 F. Supp. 325, 329 (D. Md. 1962), holding the motive of a
state's attorney as to suppressing or withholding evidence to be immaterial if it is "vital,"
i.e., likely to have affected the result of the trial. See also Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 35, 40
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1968).
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A retreat from this position was signaled in Barbee v. Warden.139 Barbee
concerned passive nondisclosure of evidence tending to show that the
defendant had not used the weapon, which witnesses identified as the one
used in a shooting. The court refused to make a final determination that the
jury would have given no weight to the unrevealed evidence. After noting the
tendency toward requiring a showing of prejudice in cases of passive nondisclosure while demanding no showing of prejudice for cases of knowing use
of false testimony, the court looked to Fahy v. Connecticut.140 In Fahy, the
United States Supreme Court declined to speculate that an error might have
been harmless. Although there may be sufficient properly admitted evidence
upon which the defendant could have been convicted, "[t]he question is
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction."141
The Supreme Court expanded Fahy while denying it was doing so in
Chapman v. California.42 Although the case did not deal with prosecutorial
disclosure, the Court declared that establishing a rule of harmless error in
cases involving a deprivation of a federal constitutional right is exclusively a
federal matter. Rejecting the proposition that all such constitutional errors
1 43
must be deemed harmful, the Court added:
There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v.
Connecticut ...and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained. We, therefore, do no more
than adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case when we hold, as we now
139. 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
140. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
141. Id. at 86-87. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966), held that with negligent suppression,
the issue of granting a new trial would turn on "[w]hether this weakening [of the prosecution's case by the undisclosed evidence] might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable
doubt about appellant's guilt." Id. at 292. The Fahy case was not cited. Nor was it cited
when the same appellant appeared again before the court in Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209
(D.C. Cir. 1967). Admitting the standard required speculation, the court quoted Griffin v.
United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950), in holding that a reviewing court must
consider "'whether it would not be too dogmatic, on the basis of mere speculation, for any
court to conclude that the jury would not have attached significance to the evidence favorable to the defendant had the evidence been before it."' Id. at 1212. This, among other
aspects of the court's opinion, provoked a blistering dissent by Judge Burger. A sampling:
"To an utterly absurd legal standard of prosecutorial negligence-without-duty, the majority
now applies a reviewing standard which is ridiculous and anti-climactical in the extreme."
Id. at 1217. "The public should be pardoned if it loses confidence in the administration of
criminal justice ....
"Id. at 1230.
142. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969), according to
the opinion of the Court, reaffirms Chapman. According to Justice Brennan, dissenting,
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Marshall, Harrington overrules Chapman by
shifting the inquiry from "whether the constitutional error contributed to the conviction to
whether the untainted evidence provided 'overwhelming' support for the conviction ...."
Id. at 255. See Jones v. State, 227 So. 2d 326 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969). Cf. Sturgis v. State,
No. 2268 (4th D.C.A. Fla., filed March 4, 1970).
143. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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do, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Chapman was followed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jackson v.
JVainwright.1 4 In Jackson petitioner alleged that the prosecution did not
reveal that an eyewitness to the rape of which the defendant was convicted
stated that the skin of the person she saw was lighter than the defendant's.
The Florida supreme court had earlier denied petitioner a new trial, inter
alia, on the ground that the eyewitness's statement would not produce a different result. 14 5 The court of appeals disagreed, citing Chapman and stating

that it could not assume that had the evidence been made available to the
defense, it would not have affected the jury's deliberations. ' 6
A retreat from the proposition stated in Jackson was sounded in United
States v. Keogh,14 7 although the opinion cited neither Jackson nor Chapman.
Returning to an analysis similar to that employed in Kyle v. United States,1 48
4
L
it was stressed that:

9

In seeking a workable solution courts must consider not only the
maximizing of protection to convicted defendants but the avoidance
of impossible burdens on prosecutors and the need to preserve the
finality of convictions rendered after trials as nearly faultless as human
frailties will permit.
Further, the court emphasized:1 50
Deliberate prosecutional misconduct is presumably infrequent; to
invalidate convictions in the few cases where this is proved, even on a
fairly low showing of materiality, will have a relatively small impact
on the desired finality of judgments and will deter conduct undermining the integrity of the judicial system. The request cases also stand
on a special footing; the prosecution knows of the defense's interest,
and, if it has failed to honor this even in good faith, it has only itself
to blame. Failure to appreciate the use to which the defense could
place evidence in the prosecution's hands, or forgetfulness that it
exists when a development in the trial has given it a new importance,
are quite different. Since this must happen to the most scrupulous
prosecutors and the issue of deterrence scarcely arises, the problem
of the courts and the wider interests of society unite to require a
substantially higher probability that disclosure of the evidence to the
144. 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968).
145. Jackson v. State, 132 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1961).
146. Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288, 29& (5th Cir. 1968).
147. 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968). Judge Friendly initiated his discussion with the reminder that: "We can hardly be dogmatic on the issues 'whether the prosecutor's constitu-

tional duty to disclose extends to all evidence admissible and useful to the defense, and the
degree of prejudice which must be shown to make necessary a new trial,' which in its
last encounter with the subject, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to determine."
148. 297 F.2d 507, 513 (2d Cir. 1961).
149. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 1968).

150. Id. at 148.
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defense would have altered the result. To invalidate convictions in
such cases because a combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has
disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have
changed the verdict would create unbearable burdens and uncertainties.
Whether courts in the future will follow Chapman and Jackson or adopt
the more flexible position taken by Judge Friendly in Keogh is still undecided.
As Keogh pointed out, the Supreme Court has offered no guidance concerning
the standard to be applied for new trials in the still emerging law of negligent
nondisclosure. Jackson's standard for granting new trials may also be read
as limited to cases of affirmative misrepresentation that a certain witness has
no knowledge of evidence favorable to the defense. 151 Quite possibly, until
the Supreme Court clarifies the matter, the courts' choice of precedent will
primarily depend on its general attitude as to the balance of advantage in the
criminal process and the efficacy of our present system of appellate review
152
of criminal trials.
CONCLUSION

Although this article has dealt primarily with prosecutorial disclosure,
the full perspective necessary for decisions as to its optimum role in criminal
law cannot be obtained without considering its twin stepchild - criminal
discovery. Together, they represent a new force in procedure that is challenging some of our long-established notions of propriety in the criminal
processes. Full discussion of the policy implications of expanding or contracting discovery and disclosure is beyond the scope of this article. However, it
may be appropriate to single out some areas that will be of concern to those
who must respond to the challenge of new directions in criminal procedure.
Generally, the first inquiry has been whether recent decisions and legislation regarding criminal discovery and disclosure have upset the balance of
advantage in favor of an accused, thereby impairing the proper functioning
of our adversarial system.'153 Unfortunately, this most difficult question has
often been answered without careful analysis. 54
151. See Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288, 298 (5th Cir. 1968).
152. Compare, e.g., Judge Burger's dissenting opinion in Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209,
1215 (D.C. Cir. 1967) and Judge Friendly's opinion in United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d
138 (2d Cir. 1968), with that of the majority in Levin v. Clark.
153. See, e.g., Judge Burger's dissenting opinion in Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209, 1215
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Symposium, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 74 (1963).
154. Discovery and disclosure of grand jury minutes exemplifies an area where rhetoric
has often prevailed over analysis. See Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455
(1965); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv.
668 (1962). But cf. State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936); State v.
Drayton, 226 So. 2d 469 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). Professor Goldstein recognized this analytical
problem, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960). See Summers, The Tilted Scales of Criminal Justice:
The Plight of the Indigent Defendant, 5 Cmr. L. BULL. 508 (1969), for an empirical approach to the problem.
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The underlying assumption of the adversarial system of criminal law is
that a full exploration of a case by two opposing and hopefully equal parties
will produce the truth. However, the adversarial system is under increasing
attack, and this assumption is openly challenged. 155 If expanding or contracting discovery and disclosure would upset the balance of advantage but would
be more likely to produce the truth, should we not accept it?15r England and
Canada have provided for pretrial criminal discovery that goes beyond what
is now allowed in our most liberal jurisdictions with little hesitation over a
balance of advantage., 5 7 Finally, our emphasis on finding the truth at trial
rather than pretrial may be questioned. Perhaps our concern should shift to
pretrial procedures that would better screen those who must face an experience
that is at times an ordeal for the state as well as for the accused1 5 s

155. See M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS (1967); cf. Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 921 (1961). One former United
States attorney questioned whether constitutional safeguards now surrounding an accused
will permit a criminal trial to be a search for the truth. Symposium, Discovery in Federal
Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 78-79 (1963).
156. Cf. State v. Drayton, 226 So. 2d 469, 475 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
157. See Brower, Pre-Trial Procedures in Criminal Cases: A Comparative View, 2 PORTIA
L. REV. 1 (1966).
158. See, e.g., Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967), hopefully the culmination
of nearly a decade of litigation.
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